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TITLE V OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
I. INTRODUCTION
1 January 1995:
Hours before the apple fell in rain-chilled Manhattan and longer still
before the average Hollywood reveler took her first sip of bubbly, cham-
pagne corks were already popping like musket shots across Europe.
When the clock struck midnight, London time,' the European Union (EU)
grew up. Clearly, the Union grew larger geographically, monetarily and in
terms of population2 with the New Year's Day additions of Austria, Finland
and Sweden.3 Some may also argue that in joining the EU, the three new
Member States brought with them something more, namely the requisite
resources for awakening the Union's suspectedly stillborn security compo-
nent. However, while the new members possessed potential monetary and
geostrategic resources to assist the development of a common European
security policy, they also brought with them an enigmatic third trait:
neutrality. Austria, Finland and Sweden now join Ireland in creating a
Union that is more than one-fourth neutral. The implications of such
neutrality on the prospects of establishing a common foreign and security
policy in Europe are subject to widespread conjecture.
'London falls within the Greenwich Time Zone, five hours ahead of New York and eight
hours ahead of California.
2 The new EU stretches from the Atlantic to the Hungarian border and from Pelopennesus
to the Arctic Circle. Gabriele Grenz, European Union 12 becomes 15, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, International News, Dec. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
Adding the Austrians, Finns and Swedes, the population of the EU escalated by 6.2%, from
349 million to 370 million, 40% greater than the population of the United States. With the
addition of the schilling, markka and krona, the Gross Domestic Product of the EU increased
by 7%, making it 10% greater than that of the United States. Id. See also The European
Union: Now Fifteen, EC OFF. PRESS & PUB. AFF. PRESS RELEASE (Jan. 10, 1995).
' A brief summary of the negotiations leading to accession is provided in Roger Goebel,
The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland
and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092 (1995). Austria submitted its formal application
for accession on July 17, 1989. 22 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 70 (1989). Sweden followed suit
on July 1, 1991. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITmES, XXVTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTVrrIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIES 1991, at 267, 849 (1992). Finally,
on March 28, 1992, Finland formally applied. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNI-
TIES, XXVITH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIvrrIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1992,
at 269, 749 (1993). The Final Acts of Accession were signed at Corfu on June 24, 1994.
E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 86 (1994).
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Some argue that the neutral status of the new Member States was
compromised, if not altogether eliminated, when each joined the European
Union, and in so doing, accepted the common security policy provisions of
Title V of the Maastricht Treaty.4 This argument is based on the notion that
states acceding to the EU accede to the entire Union, including all laws and
provisions of the Union, and are not free to pick and choose which aspects
they wish to adhere to and which they wish to ignore, a concept referred to
as the acquis communautaire. An overestimation of the influence of this
principle might lead to a conclusion that the accession of Austria, Finland
and Sweden would contribute greatly to the Union's effort to ensure coopera-
tion in securing peace for Europe. After all, as will be explained shortly,
each of these new Member States represents to some extent a missing piece
of the security puzzle in Europe.
However, it is probably unrealistic to assume that three nations with long
histories of neutrality will suddenly become valuable allies in the Union's
efforts to form a common foreign and security policy, regardless of the other
Member States' expectations that they do so. In fact, as this article will
proceed to explain, it is reasonable to expect that the recent additions will
instead further hinder an already languorous bureaucracy that is thus far
incapable or unwilling to take the first steps toward realizing a common
foreign and security plan.
The much-heralded yet largely unmanifested significance of the 1992
Maastricht Treaty is its creation of a tri-pillared alliance of Member States
which purports to transcend economic boundaries. The drafters of the
4 Officially the Treaty on European Union, the Maastricht Treaty was signed by heads of
state of the twelve existing Member States on February 7, 1992. For the official text of the
Maastricht Treaty and its 1957 predecessor, the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(more commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome), see Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. For a compilation of the two treaties, see OFFICE FOR OFICIAL
PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN UNION: SELECTED INSTRUMENTS
TAKEN FROM THE TREATIES, Book I, Volume 1 (1993) [hereinafter EUROPEAN UNION]. Title
V of the Maastricht Treaty is reprinted in the Appendix of this article, beginning on page 632.
For the reader's convenience, all cites to Title V in this paper will be to this Appendix.
' The Maastricht Treaty created the framework for what is literally a three-dimensional
Union. The three dimensions, commonly referred to as "pillars", include 1) the European
Communities (consisting of the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the
European Community), 2) the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 3) Cooperation in
Justice and Home Affairs.
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Maastricht Treaty attempted to do this largely through Title V of the Treaty,
establishing provisions for a "common foreign and security policy", 6 as well
as through various declarations assigning the eventual role of military
defense of the Community to the Western European Union (WEU),7 which
despite its ineffectiveness, remains the closest Europe has come to a common
army.! Yet, despite a recent deluge of overt threats to Western European
security, the Union's defense vehicle has resembled a broken wheelbarrow
more than it has a freight train, dealing ineffectively (almost incompetently)
with aggression just beyond its borders, and skeptics have been quick to
question the effectiveness of the Union's so-called security component.
9
It should be recognized initially that even the full realization of Title V
would merely implicate an intergovernmental agreement on how the Member
States should contend with security issues facing them. Title V essentially
endorses a framework for cooperation more than an actual "common
policy". 10 For example, Italy would be expected to act according to agreed-
upon Community standards, but there would be no common treatment of
most security issues, let alone a common army to which Italy would be
6 In addition to Title V, the Treaty for the first time introduced provisions on cooperation
in the fields of justice and home affairs (Title VI of the Treaty).7 Specifically, Declaration (No. 30) part 1.2 is relevant. See infra text accompanying note
81.
8 See WERNER J. FELD, THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 73-
74 (1993). Founded in 1954, the WEU has never reached the status of a European army and
is unlikely to do so, even after its new role under Title V. See infra Section Ill(B). See also
infra text accompanying note 82. It should be noted that a weak structure is in place for
"Eurocorps," the "embryo joint army" consisting of troops from France, Germany, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Spain. Headquartered in Strasbourg, Eurocorps is not considered a realistic
long-term security option for Europe. See European Defence: British Sceptical of Defence
Policy Outside of NATO, EUROPEAN REPORT, March 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
9 Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said, "The very idea of a common
European house is nearly dead and is being consumed by the fires of numerous conflicts and
wars." Justin Burke & Wendy Sloane, THE CHRIsTIAN SCIENcE MoNrroR, Dec. 8, 1994, at
7.
10 Article J.l(4) of Title V reads:
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international
relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
APPENDIX, infra p. 633.
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obliged to contribute soldiers or materiel. Still, even mere cooperation
among Member States has thus far not occurred."1
The purpose of this article is to analyze the likely effects of the European
Union's inclusion of Austria, Finland and Sweden 2 on its "common foreign
and security policy" under Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. In Part II, the
author will review the main security threats that justify attempting to bring
to life Title V's proposed agreement to cooperate on common security issues.
Specifically, the security threats discussed in this paper are those posed by
the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia (both non-Member
States) and by Germany (an EU member). The reader who is already
familiar with these security threats may wish to proceed directly to part III.
Part III will serve as an introduction to the legal components of the
Maastricht Treaty designed to combat these and all threats to security,
namely Title V of the Treaty and subsequent resolutions pertaining to the
role of the Western European Union. Part IV will explain the significance
of the acquis communautaire as the concept relates to the 1995 accession
and particularly to the facilitating effect adding Austria, Finland and Sweden
theoretically could have on formulating a common foreign and security plan
in Europe. Finally, in Part V, the author will explore the flip side of the
coin, arguing that despite the new Member States' obligation to advance the
acquis communautaire, the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the
European Union is in fact more likely to stall efforts to formulate a common
"See infra note 103.
12 The 1995 accession was originally to include Norway. However, in a national
referendum that inspired an 88.5% voter turnout, Norwegians declined European Union
membership. See John Darton, A Blank Piece in EU's North Comer, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Nov. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The principle reasons for
rejecting membership were thought to be that 1) Norway enjoys some of the world's richest
fishing waters and was reluctant to share them with its neighbors, and 2) Norwegian women
feared that EU membership would compromise their current societal status, which they view
as superior to the status quo for women in the rest of Europe. See Norway's EU rejection,
MAINCHINI DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1994, at 2.
While a disappointed Helmut Kohl made assurances that "the door to the European Union
remains open to Norway despite this outcome," others such as British Member of the
European Parliament Pauline Greene were not so understanding. Greene warned that
"Norway has voted for ice-bound isolation from mainstream Europe." See Darton, supra.
Despite its rejection, Norwegian Prime Minister Bjoem Tor Godal says that Norway may still
provide peacekeepers to the WEU. See Rolf Soderlind, Non-member Norway weighs force
contribution to WEU, REUTERS, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
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security policy than to facilitate these efforts. The reason for this conclusion
centers on the blocking power the neutral Member States will have in the
Council and the overall ability of four dissenters to paralyze the Union's
search for a common security policy, given the current emphasis on
unanimity and qualified majority voting.
II. SUMMARY OF RECENT SECURITY THREATS TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. The Former Soviet Union
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's European neighbors huddled
nervously, like a family waiting in the closet for a burglar to leave. As late
as the early 1980s, war between the Soviet Union and the United States
appeared to be a real possibility 3 and would certainly have involved
Western Europe. As it turned out, the Soviet Union was overcome in 1992
not by external war, but by internal revolution. 4 However, while Russians
struggled for independence, Europeans watched helplessly as their idealistic
visions of peace in a post-Soviet Europe were swallowed by the reality of
turmoil.
Upon dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the command and
organizational structures of the Soviet army" and maintained a fighting
force of 2.72 million troops.16 It is not entirely clear who will have control
of these troops, however, as Russians continue to question the transition to
" Some suggest that a direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union, which may have lead to nuclear war, was averted only by recollections of the
devastation suffered by Hiroshima as a result of the atom bomb. Margret Johannsen, Beyond
Deterrence through Common Security, in RETHINKING EUROPEAN SECURrrY 45 (Furio Cerutti
& Rodolfo Ragionieri eds., 1990).
'4 It has been suggested by many that the demise of the Soviet Union was a necessary
precondition to the 1995 accession. As stated by Professor Goebel, "Prior to the fatal
weakening of the Soviet Union and the total collapse of Marxism in central Europe, Austria,
Finland and Sweden could never have seriously entertained the idea of joining such a
fundamentally western bloc as the European Community-nor, doubtlessly, could the
Community have seriously considered taking the risk of Soviet displeasure by allowing either
Austria or Finland to join." Goebel, supra note 3, at 1099-1100.
" TREVOR TAYLOR, EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNIoN 8 (1994).
16 Julia Malone, Clinton in Europe for Talks, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 10, 1994, at IA.
Although in the process of downsizing, the Russian army's goal was still to have 2.1 million
troops in 1995. TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 34.
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democracy and are increasingly supporting Communist leaders such as
Gennadi Zyuganov, who appears set to challenge Boris Yeltsin for the
Russian presidency.1 7 The metaphoric burglar may again be on the prowl.
While Western Europe originally supported independence movements in
the former Soviet Union, such movements are now causing considerable
malaise. The same anti-independence displays of military force that
prompted Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to resign in 1990"
have recurred in places such as Abkhazia, Chechnya and Nagarno-Karabakh,
the troubled enclave of Azerbaijan.19 Even setting aside the emergence of
" Michael Specter, 'The Great Russia Will Live Again', N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, at
28.
is See Marcel Garces, Soviet Union: Shevardnadze continues in eye of Hurricane, INTER
PRESS SERVIcE, Dec. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. As Foreign
Minister and rumored vice presidential candidate, Shevardnadze had been a close ally of
President Mikhail Gorbachev since 1985. Id. His reversal of the "Brezhnev doctrine" of
stopping any rollback of Communism and his assistance to Eastern European allies in their
attempts to overthrow Communist systems had alternately earned him global respect and local
criticism. See Alison Mitchell, Shevardnadze Quits: Protests, 'reactionaries'; Gorbachev
asks him to stay, NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 1990, at 5. However, Shevardnadze felt compelled to
resign in 1990, citing what he perceived as a threat of dictatorship ending the process of
perestroika. Id. In his widely publicized resignation speech, Shevardnadze expressed his
clear concern for the treatment of independence-seekers by his government:
Dictatorship is gaining ground. The reformers have left the stage. No one
knows what kind of dictatorship there will be, and who will be the dictator.
I would like to make the following announcement: I am resigning... Let
this be my contribution, if you wish, my protest against the impending
dictatorship. I consider it my duty as a man, as a citizen and as a Communist.
I cannot reconcile myself to all the events that are occurring in our country
and all the trials that are awaiting our people. Id.
Shevardnadze added, "I'll always support until my dying day the ideas of perestroika and
renovation and democratization." Id. See also Michael Pugh, Conclusion: from cold war
to cold peace? in EUROPEAN SEcuRrrY-TOwARDs 2000 163 (Michael Pugh ed., 1992).
'9 See Trevor Royle, Old Alliance at risk in the shifting sands of an enlarged EU, THE
SCOTSMAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at 16. See TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 52. The pattern of violence
is tragically predictable. One ethnic group, in an attempt to assert its sovereignty, clashes
with another. This aggression is then aggravated by Russian military attempts to combat
violence with violence. Fighting between national guardsmen and local armed groups, which
leads to bloodshed and lost lives, is all too common an occurrence. See Richard Balmforth,
More Killed in Fresh Violence in Karabakh, Georgia, REuTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. One writer predicts, "Russia's slide into
the use of force, following the example of Georgia (in Abkhazia) and Azerbaijan (in Nagorny-
Karabakh), could push Russia back into the 19th century, towards a prolonged Caucasian
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Russia and the potential that a small, formerly Soviet country might itself
instigate a nuclear war with weapons it inherited,' Europe must now face
the difficult intelligence burden of monitoring the military of not one govern-
ment, but fifteen.2"
Meanwhile, the European Community continues to provide financial
support to the former Soviet Union to aid in its rebuilding process. Germany
alone provided $10 billion worth of assistance to the former Soviet Union
over the past four years, including payment for housing and relocating
former Soviet troops.22 The European Community, as an entity, contributed
$1.6 billion to the cause.' Additionally, trade with Europe is of great help,
and Russia's biggest trading partner continues to be the European Communi-
ty.' Financially assisting such troubled nations may be admirable on a
humanitarian level, but the security consequences of doing so may prove
akin to those of rescuing a pit bull from a tree.
Still, as the Community helps the former Soviet Union to its feet, it is
cautious of being pulled down in the process." As one expert warns, "A
stable Europe depends on a relatively smooth reconstruction process in the
Soviet Union. This may not be possible in the 1990s."'26
B. The Former Yugoslavia
While the threats to European security posed by the former Soviet Union
are daunting, the civil war raging in Yugoslavia is more than just a potential
war." Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Don't divide and rule, Moscow NEWS, Oct. 7, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
" See TAYLOR, supra note 15. at 14. See also John Lewis Gaddis, International
Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, INT'L SECURITY, Vol. 17, No. 3, winter 1992-
93, at 5 ("Surprise remains one of the few things one can count on").
21 See Pugh, supra note 18, at 169.
2 Id. at 164.
2 Id.
24 Trade with Europe currently accounts for about 37% of total Russian foreign trade.
Russia conducts an additional 24% of its trade with the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and small amounts of trade with China (6%), the United States (4%) and Japan (3%). Gary
Yerkey, EU official urges Russia to ratify pact on improving ties with Europe, INT'L TRADE
REp., Nov. 23, 1994, at 1817.
25 See Michael Sturmer, Beware of soft options for security, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995,
at 15 ("[T]he end of the Soviet Union is still, and will continue to be, Europe's overriding
security problem," referring to recent conflicts such as that in Chechnya).
26 Pugh, supra note 18, at 170.
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security threat. War broke out in June 1991 when the Yugoslav army,
under Serbian control, attacked the Slovenian militia.28 The conflict has
since spread like a deadly plague, particularly infecting the diverse
population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as Muslims, Serbs and Croats struggle for
their respective ethnic sovereignty.29 To this date the Bosnian Serbs have
conquered most of Bosnia, leaving a bloody trail of inhumanity and atrocities
along the way.30
The European Community has been involved in attempts to mediate the
conflict from its outset.3 In a declaration establishing the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia32 which urged arbitration, 3 the EC
said it could not "stand idly by as the bloodshed in Croatia increase[d] day
by day."'  Unfortunately, although Europe's efforts have not fanned the
fire in Yugoslavia, neither have they doused the flames.
Probably the most successful European faction in mitigating the hostilities
was the Western European Union. However, even its intervention was halted
by lack of Community support and Russian threats against Western European
involvement.35 Lacking a truly effective common foreign and security
27 Venice, Italy lies just a stone's throw away from the fighting. Although separated by
the Adriatic Sea, Bosnia and Venice are still only about 200 miles apart. What few may
realize is that the distance between Bosnia and Venice is even less than that between Munich
and Berlin, which are approximately 280 miles apart. Id.
28 See Christian J. Garris, Bosnia and the Limitations of International Law, 34 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1039 (1994).
29 id.
3 Id. For an excellent overview of the Yugoslavian conflict, including demographic
information, see generally Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
31 Interestingly, the bulk of the European forces have been from two of the Member States
furthest from Yugoslavia: the United Kingdom and France. See Lionel Barber & Christopher
Parkes, Bosnia clouds EU summit hopes on eastern Europe, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1994, at 1.
For an approach to the EU security dilemma using Yugoslavia as a model, see Max Jakobson,
Collective Security in Europe Today, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 18, No. 2, at 59 (1995).
32 U.N. Doc. S/24795 (1992). The declaration was made on August 27, 1991, two months
after the war began. Garris, supra note 28, at 1050.
33 See Weller, supra note 30, at 576.
3 Id.
35 The Secretary General of the WEU, William van Ecklen, suggested that force be used
"to isolate the sources of conflict as far as possible. We would be there to ensure an orderly
process of change .... . Id. at 574. However, these plans were thwarted as bullyish Russia
flexed its military muscle, warning that "to enter ... on one side ... would mean to come
into conflict automatically with others, inside and outside Yugoslavia. And the conflict would
610 [Vol. 25:601
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policy, even after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, clearly has hindered
the Community's efforts to deal with security threats such as Yugoslavia.
C. Germany
Jean Monnet, a well-known French political economist, and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill were two of the frst proponents of a European
Union, viewing a "United States of Europe" as the best way to restrain the
development of Germany.36 Their contemporaries, former French President
Francois Mitterrand and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
fearing the ramifications of a rebuilt German power, are thought to have
attempted to delay the unification of Germany in 1989 and 1990.3' Both
France and Britain continue to oppose German membership in the U.N.
Security Council.38
Why the huge concern over a country which just fifty years ago was left
devastated by war? The answer is two-fold: 1) Europe will not soon forget
the Germany of World War II, and 2) Germany has rebuilt itself into one of
the world's foremost economic and military powers, making it an increasing
threat to the Community despite its status as a Member State.39
In January of 1933, Adolf Hitler's Nationalist Socialist party came into
power in Germany.40 What followed was one of the greatest horrors in
human history. In 1945, the Allies finally overcame the German Reich,
ending a war that had virtually swallowed Europe whole.41 Europe barely
survived; 50 million people did not.42
Germany remained silent for years. Its greatest buildings, museums and
churches had been reduced to rubble in the war, and the Berlin Wall
grow into an all-European one." Id.
3 Xia Zhiimian, Stronger Germany tilts equilibrium of Western Europe, XNHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Dec. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
' Id. Officially, the unification occurred on October 3, 1990.
38 Id.
" The 15 current Member States of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
40 Johannsen, supra note 13, at 44.
41 "In Nazi ideology war was considered less a calamity than an instrument for survival
of the fittest." Id.
42 id.
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continued to imprison many of its own people.43 The remainder of Europe,
concerned with its own rebuilding, slept with one eye open. Meanwhile,
with an efficiency surpassed only by that involved in the erection of the
Wall, Germany rebounded to become a global economic power once again.
During the Cold War, Germany was cautiously allowed back into its
former enemies' good graces, as Western Europe scrambled for allies to
prepare for a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union." In the
process, Germany fortified its economy and its military, each to staggering
levels. Today, Germany easily tops the rest of Europe in wealth and
challenges its strongest neighbors in military capacity.
Germany is by far the wealthiest member of the European Community.
In 1993, its Gross National Product was $1.71 trillion, while France was next
at a distant $1.25 trillion.45 Germany enjoys a $21 billion trade surplus
while the United Kingdom, for example, wallows in a $32.1 billion
deficit.' In fact, Germany's economy is so advanced, Britain may not
reach the present German level until 205 1.
Germany's arms industry is one reason for its economic resurgence.
Unlike France, whose industry is predominantly government owned and
under the policy control of the French Chief Executive," the German arms
industry is privatized49 and not subject to the agenda of any government
actor or agency.50 The largest manufacturer of arms in Germany, Siemens
AG, is also its largest private employer, and one of the largest employers in
3 The Wall did not come down until November 9, 1989.
See Hans-Joachim Spanger, Germany after unity: bridge or frontier between East and
West?, in EUROPEAN SEcURIrY-TOwARDs 2000, supra note 18, at 69.
45 U.S.-E.C. Facts and Figures (U.S. Mission to the European Union), May 1994, at 21-
23.
46 id.
47 SIDNEY POLLARD, THE WASTING OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY 18 (1982).
48 Johannes Gerber, The Political, Economic and Military Framework, in A SINGLE
EUROPEAN ARMS INDusTRY? EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRIES IN THE 1990s, at 11 (Jane
Davis Drown et al. eds., 1990).
49 id.
-' One consequence of a privatized system, however, is that it subjects military arms
manufacturing to market influences. In theory, should the demand wane because Germany
or other countries no longer wish to purchase arms from German manufacturers, the supply
would necessarily decrease as well. If this happened, Germany would be forced to convert
much of its efforts from making guns to making butter. However, as the current sales to
other countries is steady, such a transition currently appears unlikely. Id.
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all of Europe.5
In short, Germany has the capacity to do great harm in Europe and an
historic propensity to do so. These threatening truths are compounded by
incidents such as the recent re-emergence of racial violence in Germany
2
and Germany's demands for complete ejection of all non-German forces
from German soil.53
Once again, Europe is quietly holding its breath, unsure of what to expect
from its reborn yet eerily familar neighbor. Much as Monnet, Churchill,
Mitterrand, and Thatcher worked to straightjacket German development,s'
the speed and efficiency with which Germany has rebuilt itself this time may
have been one of the incentives for drafting the provisions of Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty.5
III. LAYING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR A MORE SECURE UNION
Europe will not exist if it cannot ensure its defense by itself.
French President Francois Mitterrand
5 6
While some stand firm in their objections,57 the above perception is
5' Siemens employs 240,000 people in Germany and 108,000 elsewhere in the world.
Kelly Campbell, Current State of Defence Cooperation and the United States Role, in A
SINGLE EUROPEAN ARMs INDUSTRY?, supra note 48, at 52.
Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), having recently merged with competitor VFW-
Fokker, is now just slightly smaller than Siemens. Id. at 53-55. This clearly (and for Europe,
alarmingly) demonstrates the extent to which the arms industry dominates Germany, and how
Germany's military production and economy are inextricably linked.
52 See JOHN APPLEBY & EDwARD FOSTER, UP IN THE AIR: EUROPEAN UNION AND
TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE INDusTRIAL COOPERATION 8 (1993).
53 FELD, supra note 8, at 10.
54 See Zhimian, supra note 36.
" As one analysis reckoned, "[W]ith the crumbling of the Cold War order came the
reappearance of a Germany whole and free, a development which so upset Western Europe's
internal balance that the more distant agenda for European Union was brought forward."
APPLEBY & FOSTER, supra note 52, at 6.
5' MIcHAEL MOODIE, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPE 92, at 20 (1990).
' Predictably, historically neutral countries are the most ardent objectors. For example,
Irish military leaders are concerned that a common security policy would inevitably lead to
a common army which could well be run by the Germans. Comdt. Dermot Donnelly of the
Irish Air Corps cited the Gulf War as an example of "what can happen when more powerful
countries such as America hijack an organization such as the UN. The same can very easily
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increasingly shared by citizens of the European Community.5' The search
to provide Europe with a legal framework for handling security issues,
however, has been lengthy and arduous. After all, since its creation by the
Treaty of Rome in 1958, the European Community59 had purposefully
remained a strictly economic association.60 Its transition to one which now
invokes the cooperation of each Member State in handling security issues
required a legal foundation. The Community gave birth to such a foundation
in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent declarations regarding
the Western European Union.
A. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty61
In 1986 one writer ended his forecast of European defense in the 1990s
by noting that "the outcome of a European security policy, no matter how
happen in a German-led Europe. ... I feel that we will lose a lot of moral authority
internationally if we align ourselves with the bullies of the world." Jim Cusack, Prospect of
European army raised by officers, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at 2.
58 Numerous polls have been conducted to determine the extent to which Europeans favor
having a common security policy. In 1987 less than half of EC citizens polled wanted to see
the Community move beyond the single market, but of these a majority in each Member State
favored including a common security policy: Belgium (69%), Denmark (65%), Greece (81%),
Spain (71%), France (84%), Ireland (69%), Italy (72%), Luxembourg (66%), the Netherlands
(75%), Portugal (80%) and the United Kingdom (77%). FELD, supra note 8, at 23, 26.
By 1989, 36% of EC citizens favored a common security policy, while only 30% opposed
such a move. Id. at 2. In October 1990, in the wake of the nearby Gulf Crisis, 61% favored
a common defense and 29% expressed opposition. Id.
By 1993, 77% believed the European Community should pursue a common defense policy,
compared to only 13% opposed to the idea. Jonathan Faull, Lecture at the Brussels Seminar
on Law and Institutions of the European Community, Institut d'Etudes Europeennes (July 5,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Faull Lecture].
" The European Community was originally the European Economic Community,
indicating its true intentions. See supra note 4.
The closest the Treaty of Rome came to even discussing security was in Article 223(1):
a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure
of which it considers contrary to the essential elements of its security;
b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for
the protection of the essential interests of its security which are
connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war
material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products which are not
intended for specifically military purposes.
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 4, at 385.
6, As noted previously, the complete text of Title V is reprinted in the Appendix to this
paper.
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necessary, remains at this point more a matter of hope than certainty."'62
Six years later, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, providing that a "common
foreign and security policy is hereby established, 63 suggested that Europe
was ready to adapt to reach this necessary security policy.
Following this initial precept establishing a "common foreign and security
policy", Article J.1(2) sets out the Member States' objectives:
* to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and
independence of the Union;
* to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member
States in all ways;
* to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act
and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
* to promote international cooperation; [and]
* to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law,
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."
However important, these objectives if left unsupplemented would have
rendered Title V a toothless provision, lacking the means for implementation.
The EU therefore appointed the Western European Union as its defense arm.
B. The Western European Union
There was considerable competition for the job of Europe's defender. One
possibility was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), which resulted from the Helsinki Act and played an active, albeit
ineffective, role in trying to resolve the Yugoslavian conflict." The reasons
behind CSCE's poor performance in Yugoslavia were inherent in its
62 JOSEPH RALLO, DEFENDING EUROPE IN THE 1990s, at 130 (1986).
63 APPENDIX, Art. J., infra p. 632.
6APPENDIX, infra p. 632.
65 On January 1, 1995, CSCE was renamed OSCE: Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
6See FELD, supra note 8, at 131. CSCE's role was mainly one of facilitating cease-fires
and attempting to bring the parties to the negotiation table. Id.
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structure. First, all fifty-four members of CSCE67 have an equal vote in
deciding how to respond to security threats." For example, San Marino
and Malta can together outvote France. Further, CSCE regularly requires a
consensus before action can be taken.69 In the end, the European Union
simply could not count on a defense branch which was so innately
stagnant ° and largely non-European.7"
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was another obvious
contender. With the United States as its most powerful member,72 NATO
was Western Europe's savior during the Cold War and continues today to be
one of the world's most powerful multinational forces.73 Europe's emer-
gence from the shadow of the Soviet Union, however, is perceived to have
largely eliminated its need for NATO. 74 NATO is extremely expensive to
operate,75 and many Europeans 76 found it hard to justify such a large price
67 For a complete list of participating states, from Albania to Uzbekistan (and including
the Vatican), see 1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1994
U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Dec. 12, 1994.
60 FELD, supra note 8, at 66.
69 Id.
'o As Werner Feld notes, "There seems to be little doubt that the peacekeeping and
economic facilities of CSCE will develop further in the future, but it is unlikely that a military
structure can be erected for rapid defensive action because its deployment would require
consensus by over fifty member states." Id.
71 But cf THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: THE NEXT PHASE (Kate Holder, Robert E. Hunter
& Paavo Lipponen eds., 1991) (a collection of essays, most arguing that CSCE has a place
in defending the EC).
7 The 16 current NATO members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
have each applied to join NATO.
' In a 1994 speech in Budapest, U.S. President Bill Clinton stated, "NATO remains the
bedrock of security in Europe." 1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, 1994 U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Dec. 12, 1994. While this is certainly a
debatable assertion, several EU Member States appear reluctant to allow NATO's role in
Europe to diminish. See infra note 138.
74 As Strobe Talbott writes, "The trouble is, NATO is broken, at least conceptually. Its
reason for being was to deter the Soviet Union from launching an invasion through West
Germany to the English Channel. With that danger diminished to the vanishing point, NATO
is already undergoing its own deconstruction . .. " Strobe Talbott, Defusing the German
Bomb, TIME, July 2, 1990, at 34.
' NATO cost $144 billion in the 1992 fiscal year alone. MOODIE, supra note 56, at 8.
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tag on an organization that doesn't even allow Europe exclusively to make
its own decisions.""
At a meeting in Rome in 1991,"8 U.S. President George Bush issued a
request to the European members of NATO: "[I]f your ultimate aim is to
provide individually for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.7 9
Article J.4(2) of Title V reflects Europe's response:
The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which
is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the
institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrange-
ments.80
Additionally, Declaration No. 30(I)(2) specifically gives the WEU the
authority to "formulate common European defense policy and carry forward
its concrete implementation through further development of its own
operational role."8
Noticeably absent from the text of both Title V and the Declarations is
any mention of the WEU serving as a common army or military force.
Clearly the drafters of Maastricht did not intend to expand the WEU's
authority this far.8 2 The WEU's authority is expressly limited to formulat-
ing policy, and even these WEU-created policies are subject to approval by
the Council.83 Nevertheless, the integration of the WEU into the European
Union was a welcome sight to some of the best known "Euroadvocates."8'
76 In December 1989, 36% of those polled favored an EC defense, while 30% favored
continuation of NATO. FELD, supra note 8, at 29.
77 Both the United States and Canada are members of an otherwise European NATO. See
supra note 72.
7 The meeting took place on November 7-8, 1991. FELD, supra note 8, at 15.
79d.
80 APPENDIX, infra p. 635.
81 EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 4, at 38.
82 In fact, Title V expressly shelves the issue of having an actual common defense: "The
common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead
to a common defence. APPENDIX, Art. 1.4(1), infra p. 635 (emphasis added).
'0 See APPENDIX, Art. J.4(2), infra p. 635.
84 Particularly former European Commission President Jacques Delors, who in large part
spearheaded this movement. In a March 7, 1991 speech in London at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Delors said, "If we are to create a European Union, a lengthy
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IV. ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE, THE 1995 ACCESSION, AND THE POTENTIAL
REALIZATION OF A "COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY"
A. An Overview of the Acquis Communautaire from 1969 to the Present
In 1969, the European Economic Community"5 consisted of only six
members," but was considering admitting four new ones. 7 Such radical
expansion would have the inevitable effect of diluting the four original
Member States' control in the Council, Commission and, of somewhat lesser
importance, the European Parliament. The likelihood of subsequent
accessions threatened to make the original four nations a minority in the
decision making processes, and would potentially allow newer members to
reshape the focus of the Community. In order to insure against drastic
changes in the Community's stated philosophy, the Heads of State and
Government convened at the Hague Summit and determined that all
applicant States, as a prerequisite to entering negotiations for accession to the
Community, would have to agree to accept all the applicable treaties and the
overall political objective of the Community. 8
This concept, referred to as the acquis communautaire, continues to
govern accession agreements today, although as will be explained presently,
it now applies to accession to the European Union, which consists in part of
Title V's provisions on a common foreign and security policy. The term
acquis communautaire, increasingly becoming part of the Eurovernacular,
defies easy translation to English. Although numerous authors have
endeavored to adequately define it,89 perhaps Carlo Curti Gialdino does so
process must be set in motion to allow integration of the WEU ... into the Community."
Europe Documents, No. 1699, March 13, 1991, at 7. For more on Delors, see infra note 94.
8' The European Economic Community (EEC) was later renamed the European
Community (EC).
86 The original members were Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries
(Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg).
' These potential additions were Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Norway
(which never joined).
" See Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on 1-2 Dec.
1969 at the Hague, in THIRD GENERAL REPORT OF THE AcTvrriEs oF THE COMMUNrTY 1969.
" Leading scholars have defined acquis communautaire as follows: "The Community
Patrimony [which] includes the whole body of Community law, including the Treaties,
legislation, the general principles of law, case law, etc.." David O'Keeffe, Judicial Protection
of the Individual by the European Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 901. 913 (1996);
"the idea that the institutional structure, scope, policies and rules of the Community (now
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most succinctly: "It means, in substance, that the applicant States must
accept 'without reservation' the whole of the following: the founding
Treaties and their political objectives, all measures enacted after the
establishment of the Community, as well as the options chosen for the
development of the European construct."'  Gialdino also writes that, in
terms of accession, the acquis "refers to the whole body of rules, political
principles and judicial decisions which new Member States must adhere to,
in their entirety and from the beginning, when they become members of the
Communities (after Maastricht, of the European Union)."9
Before 1992, there was no European Union, only a European Community,
so definitions of acquis communautaire that antedate the Maastricht Treaty
obviously do not recognize an obligation on the part of the applicant State
to adhere to provisions set forth in the 1992 Treaty. After 1992, States no
longer apply to the EC; they apply to the EU, which includes, inter alia,
Title V's provisions on a common foreign and security policy. This means
that the notion of the acquis communautaire now extends not only to the
economic aspects of the Community but also to the security aspects of the
Union. In its 1992 Report, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement," the
European Commission expressly expanded the term acquis communautaire
to include "the contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties,
including the Maastricht Treaty."' In the same year, the Lisbon European
Council required that subsequent accession take place only on the basis of
acceptance by the applicants of the Maastricht Treaty.93 In 1993, former
Union) are to be treated as 'given' ('acquis'), not to be called into question or substantially
modified by new States at the time they enter." Goebel, supra note 3, at 1095; "the progress
made to date and the status quo recognized in integration achievements which must be
accepted by every nation joining the EC." Kurt Riechenberg, The Merger of Trading Blocks
and the Creation of the European Economic Area: Legal and Judicial Issues, 4 TUL. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 63, 68 (1995); and "acquired rights . .. [including] all those rights held by
citizens of the Community by virtue of EC legislation and regulation." Michael John
Volkovitsch, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of State Succession to Responsibility
for International Delicts, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2162, 2205 (1992).
90 Carlo Curti Gialdino, Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire, 32 COMMON
MKr. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1995). Mr. Gialdino is Legal Secretary of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities and the Executive Editor of Rivista di diritto europeo.
9 Id. at 1090.
92 E.C. BULL., no. 3, supp. (1992) at 12 (emphasis added).
" 25 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 10 (1992).
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European Commission President Jacques Delors9 said, "new members will
have to accept the acquis communautaire ... the whole Union Treaty and
nothing but the Union Treaty."
95
Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty itself makes several references to the acquis
communautaire. The fifth indentation of Article B lists as one of the
Union's objectives, "to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build
on it with a view to considering . . . to what extent the policies and forms
of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim
of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the
Community."'  The first paragraph of Article C reads: "The Union shall
be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain
its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communau-
taire.' '97  Perhaps most important for our purposes, Article 0 of the
Maastricht Treaty has been interpreted as extending the notion of the acquis
communautaire to the European Union as a whole.98
94 Delors has been replaced by Jacques Santer, the former prime minister of Luxembourg.
Santer was elected by a 416 to 103 vote with 59 abstentions. Tyler Marshall, Luxembourg's
Ex-Premier confirmed as EU leader, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1955, at A14. For more details on
the significance of Santer's election, see also Wilbur G. Landrey, What a difference a Jacques
makes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 16, 1994, at 2A.
Delors was considered a top candidate to replace fellow socialist Francois Mitterrand as
president of France. See Tony Allen-Mills, Shrewd Delors plays at being modest messiah,
SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. However,
Delors surprisingly chose not to run, and Jacques Chirac, formerly mayor of Paris, won the
May 7, 1995 run-off election with just over half of the vote. See Jobs top the agenda for
victor Chirac, THE INDEPENDENT, May 8, 1995, at 1.
9 Address to the European Parliament on the Occasion of the Investment Debate of the
New Commission, Feb. 10, 1993, E.C. BULL., supp 1/93.
96 EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 4, at 24.
97 id.
Article 0 reads as follows:
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall
address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after
consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European
Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the
Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This
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It would therefore appear that by joining the European Union, Austria,
Finland and Sweden are obligated to cooperate fully in all aspects of the
Union's common foreign and security dimension. Recall that Article J.1(4)
of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty states:
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which
is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The
Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. 9
It could be argued that by acceding to the Union (and perhaps also by
assuming observer status in the WEU), the three newest Member States have
taken a vow of non-neutrality.
As the author will attempt to explain in Part V," ° this is probably an
unrealistic conclusion. For now, however, let us consider the potential
implications of Austria, Finland and Sweden cooperating fully in the
handling of the Union's security issues.
Theoretically, with the additions of Austria, Finland and Sweden and the
integration of the Western European Union with the EU, Europe might
finally be able to provide an effective common security policy for itself.
Before the 1995 accession, the EU had grossly mishandled or failed to
address security threats, particularly in the former Soviet Union and the
former Yugoslavia, leading critics to wonder whether there was any
substance whatsoever to Title V. °1 Moreover, some Member States
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Id. at 56-57.
APPENDIX, infra p. 633.
'0 Part V begins on page 626.
'0' Former Commission official Jean Durieux, author of a recent report entitled "European
security policy in the run up to 2000-Ways and means of achieving real credibility," has
called Title V "fragmented" and "rudderless." See Lionel Barber, EU must end "rudderless"
foreign policy, FIN. TIMAEs, Jan. 28, 1995, at 2. In an earlier article, Barber wrote, "Tlhe
Union is not living up to its name: its common security and foreign policy is a sham ....
Lionel Barber, Hopes of wider union turn to fear of no union, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1994, at
2. But c.f Faull Lecture, supra note 58. "There may be widespread disillusionment and
cynicism at the moment about the EU's will and capacity to cope with international problems
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occasionally seemed unaware that a framework for handling security issues
even existed under Title V, completely ignoring established protocol' 2 by
attempting to handle the issues independently and without communicating
their plans to any Community institution or representative. 1°3 Perhaps it
could be argued that, having acceded to the EU and being legally obligated
to promote the acquis communautaire, Austria, Finland and Sweden now fill
the gaps of a previously porous security makeup. To some extent, this is
probably true. As is explained below, each new Member State, in addition
to having observer status in the WEU,'" offers something to assist the
EU's efforts to handle security issues occurring in neighboring countries.
B. The Potential Value of Austria, Finland and Sweden to EU Security
1. Austria'°5
Austria's wealth and strategic location in what will soon be the heart of
the European Union"° would make it a particularly valuable asset in
even in its own 'back yard' (former Yugoslavia), but the mechanisms and perception of
common interest are clearly set out in [the Maastricht Treaty] and it is hard to see how the
EU can avoid assuming and facing up to its responsibilities for peace and security, in Europe
and elsewhere, for years to come." Id.
102 "Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter
of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined
influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action."
APPENDIX, Art. J.2(l), infra p. 633.
103 Examples of individual Member State deviations from the Union's common foreign
and security framework include France's go-it-alone approach to Rwanda, the Greek trade
embargo against Macedonia, and the Bosnia "contact group" composed of France, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Russia. See Barber, EU must end "rudderless" foreign
policy, supra note 101, at 2.
'04 This means that initially the new members will be fully informed on WEU
developments but will have a limited influence on decision-making. See Finland to become
WEU observer, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See
also A partner for peace, IRISH TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1995, at 13 (on Ireland's similar status as
WEU observer).
"0 In a national referendum on June 12, 1994, Austria voted two-to-one (66%) to accede
to the European Union. Voters Shun Top Party but Austria Wants to Join, PRESS ASsOC.
NEWSFILE, June 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
'0 Germany has made no secret that it wishes to be the center of Europe and has
advocated EU expansion to Eastern and Central Europe for this reason. It has even decided
to change its capital from Bonn to the more eastern Berlin. See Zhimian, supra note 36.
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shaping the EU's common foreign and security policy under Title V.
Austria provides an additional border with Germany, supplementing those of
Member States Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, and leaving
only neutral Switzerland and potential EU members Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia as non-EU German borders.
Through Austria the European Union would bring a sizable military threat
of its own to the German border.17 Interestingly, as there are no published
official reports regarding either Austrian military production or sales,"08 the
world is uncertain just how strong Austria is and can be. However, as the
only formally neutral country to have exported the majority of its military
materiel,1" Austria is widely understood to have a formidable defense
industry.
Austria shares part of its border with Yugoslavia, potentially providing
easier access for EU-sponsored peacekeeping missions and perhaps a better
perch from which to monitor the conflict. While some initially feared that
Austria's accession would provide for Germany an ally with which to share
its native tongue, statements by Austrian officials suggest this not to be
true.
110
2. Finland"'
Finland lacks the wealth of Austria and Sweden and is the only nation of
107 Most of Austria's military production after 1955 was made possible by utilizing
German industrial plants vacated after the war. See BJORN HAGELIN, NEUTRALITY AND
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: MILITARY PRODUCTION AND SALES RESTRICTIONS IN AUSTRIA,
FINLAND, SWEDEN AND SwrrzERLAND 35 (1990).
"o Id. at 42. The only known statistics are derived from available company reports and
are considered unreliable. Id. However, one report had Austria spending $792 million in
1984. Id. at 39.
'0o Id. at 81. In 1981, Finland exported 33% of its military materiel, Sweden exported
25%, and Austria exported 92%. Id. Considering that the early 1980s were the height of the
Cold War, the fact that Austria kept only 8% of what it manufactured suggests that it may
have manufactured a considerable amount.
1o Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky has promised that Austria would fight hard for
its own interests and should not be expected to side with Germany: "I told [French President
Mitterrand] straight away that we are not the third German state. I told him that we are the
first and only Austrian state." See Erik Kirschbaum, Austria says no need to fear "Teutonic
Bloc" in EU, REuTr EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Dec. 30, 1994.
1 On October 16, 1994, approximately 57% of voting Finns approved a proposal to
become part of the EU. Finns Vote for Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A5.
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the three whose gross national product is below the EC median.112 More-
over, while Austria and Sweden have maintained continuous rearmament
policies since 1945, Finland's massive war debt and its focus on converting
wartime military industries for civilian use delayed its rearmament until the
1960s.' So with a lagging economy and sub-par military,' 1 4 Finland's
location would be its prime security asset to the Union.
Finland's strategic position arguably provides both an offensive and
defensive incentive for its inclusion in the EU's security structure. On one
hand, Finland gives the EU its first border with the former Soviet Union,"
5
an 800-mile stretch adjacent to one of the most volatile areas of Russia." 6
This massive shared frontier could facilitate any offensive actions the
Member States may eventually decide are necessary as part of their policy
in dealing with Russian security problems.
Of even greater importance to maintaining security, however, is that
Finland's EU membership protects the Union from the possibility of a future
military alliance between Finland and Russia, the threat of which had been
clear. Finland had long received the majority of its military equipment from
the Soviet Union,' 7 making it the sole neutral recipient of Soviet military
materiel." | 8 Additionally, despite having twice engaged in war with one
112 In 1991, prior to the accessions of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the median GNP of
EC Member States was $123.695 billion (Denmark). ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA BOOK OF
THE YEAR, Appendix (1994) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA]. The GNP of Finland
in 1991 was $121.982 billion, compared to Sweden's $233.190 billion and Austria's $157.528
billion. Id. Because of very wealthy countries such as Germany ($2.1 trillion GNP in 1991)
and Italy ($1.07 trillion), the three new members all fall short of the EC mean, as do seven
other Member States. Id.
113 See HAGELIN, supra note 107, at 40. For an overview of security policies in Finland
and Sweden prior to the Maastricht Treaty, see generally NORDIC SECURrrY IN THE 1990S:
OPTIoNs IN THE CHANGING EUROPE (Jan Oberg ed., 1992).
"" Specifically, as of 1994, Finland spent only 6% of its total budget on defense,
approximately 1.7% of its GNP. Paul Gillespie, Finnish leader outlines new security model,
IRISH TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1994, at 9.
115 The Finnish-Russian border extends from a "huge naval base near Murmansk in the
north to St. Petersburg in the south." See Finnish President Ahtisaari speaks as country joins
EU, REUTERS, Jan. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
116 See Sturmer, supra note 25, at 15.
117 Not until 1985 had the percentage of Soviet supplied materiel dropped below 50%.
See HAGELIN, supra note 107, at 89.
118 Id.
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another, 9 Finland and the Soviet Union have had a long history of
cooperation in the area of security." Finally, generating even greater
alarm were rumors surfacing prior to Finland's accession that Russia had
been planning to reunite with Finland once again.121 Indeed, it was in part
the fear of being left behind all alone with Russia that prompted Finland to
join the European Union 2 and the Union to open its door to its Finnish
neighbors.
3. Sweden"'
With Finland joining the EU and Norway opting to reject membership, the
accession of Sweden-Finland's only geographic connection to the
Union-was of paramount importance in terms of Community security. Had
Sweden not joined, Finland would have been left isolated with the former
Soviet Union, potentially compromising its strategic value to the Member
States.
In addition to Sweden's key geographic location, its strong military could
aid in developing a common foreign and security policy. In the late 1930s,
in response to German buildup, Sweden frantically requested military
supplies from foreign sellers, including Great Britain, France and the United
States, but was denied as potential arms traders stockpiled to protect
themselves against pending German aggression."
Sweden has since been careful to prevent this situation from recurring. In
"
9 The two nations fought twice between 1939 and 1944. See Finnish President Ahtisaari
speaks as country joins EU, supra note 115.
1' For example, Finland is technically still a party to a bilateral agreement with the Soviet
Union: the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which,
inter alia, governs the handling of situations in which Finland's acts threaten the security of
the Soviet Union. See HAGELIN, supra note 107, at 33.
121 Russian Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky had allegedly urged the
reincorporation of Finland into Russia, from which it broke away in 1917. Id.
122 See Hugh Carnegy, High political price of partnership: Scandinavian divisions over
EU entry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at 19.
'23 In a tight vote, Sweden decided to join the EU on November 13, 1994. Just over 52%
voted for accession, with almost 47% voting against. Hugh Carnegy & Christopher Brown-
Humes, Sweden gives clear Yes to EU: Vote in favour of membership keeps enlargement
timetable on course, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at 1.
'24 See HAGELIN, supra note 107, at 37.
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addition to actively importing equipment and materiel,"z Sweden is the
only formerly neutral country with indigenous research and development in
all important categories of military supplies." 6 In fact, Sweden spends two
to three times more on its military than Austria and Finland,V making it
potentially one of the European Union's most valuable security acquisitions
despite the fact that it does not border any areas of military concernm 28
V. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ACQUIs COMMUNAUTAIRE: WHY THE
PRESENCE OF AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN Is MORE LIKELY TO
HINDER THE EU's SEARCH FOR A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY THAN TO HELP IT
Although Austria, Finland and Sweden are expected by fellow Member
States to cooperate fully in the handling of the Union's common security
issues (and as was demonstrated above, each has something to offer), it is
nevertheless unlikely that any of these new members will realize its potential
worth to the Union in the area of security. In fact, it is probably fair to
conclude that any chance Europe may once have had at developing a system
of mutual cooperation in handling security issues all but vanished on January
1, 1995 when it opened its doors to Austria, Finland and Sweden. Theoreti-
cally, the principle of acquis communautaire applies to the 1995 accession,
binding Austria, Finland and Sweden to the provisions of Title V, despite
these countries' long histories of neutrality. The reality, however, is
something quite different.
The Council, chiefly responsible for taking actions under Title V and other
provisions of the Treaty, now includes representation from four neutral (or
at least formerly neutral) countries: Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden.
The importance of the Council as a decision-making institution should not
be overlooked. Article J.2(2) of Title V states, "Whenever it deems it
"2 Sweden imports helicopters, army support aircraft and light surface ships, air-to-air
missiles and heavy air defense missiles. Id. at 37.
126 These include guided missiles, fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines and light and
heavy tanks. Id. at 37.
127 In 1989 Sweden spent 2.6% of its GNP on its military, while Austria and Finland spent
1.1% and 1.6% of their respective GNPs for military purposes. See ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, supra note 112.
'28 Besides Finland, Sweden borders only Norway. Across the Baltic Sea from Sweden
are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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necessary, the Council shall define a common position."1" Further, Article
J.3 sets out the procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the
foreign and security policy as follows:
1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the
European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action.
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall
lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific
objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the
means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage
during its development, define those matters on which decisions are
to be taken by a qualified majority.
Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant
to its preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be
weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council
shall require at least 54 votes in favour, cast by at least eight mem-
bers.' 3°
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a
question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles
and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As
long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they
adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take
national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided
in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the
Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply
129 APPENDIX, infra p. 633.
130 After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 62 votes in favor (of a possible
87) are now required. See infra note 136.
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to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council
decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and
failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary
measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general
objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall
inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action,
a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss
them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run
counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effective-
ness.13 1
While the acquis communautaire generally requires compliance with Title
V provisions and "support [of] the Union's external and security policy
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity,"'
132
there is no specific requirement that any Member State vote favorably on any
security-oriented resolution being voted on by the Council. Although the
new Member States are expected to cooperate fully with the Union's desire
to establish a common security framework, they will not be prevented from
objecting to proposals attempting to define a common security policy, nor
will they be restrained from voting against a joint action.
Where unanimity is required on a security issue,1 33 it is unlikely that all
four neutral countries will agree with the majority's opinion, let alone the
remaining eleven non-neutral Member States.' 34 The truth is, the prospects
for reaching a consensus on security issues were slim with twelve Member
States; with fifteen, it will be almost impossible. And this will become an
even greater problem as future accessions take place.
"3 APPENDIX, infra pp. 633-35.
132 APPENDIX, Art. J.1(4), infra p. 633.
' Indeed, unanimity is the default rule. See APPENDIX, Art. J.8(2), infra p. 637 ("The
Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in
Article J.3(2).").
'34 As Professor O'Keeffe indicates, "events such as a lack of consensus between Member
States during the Gulf war are identified as demonstrating the impossibility of European
cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and defence." David O'Keeffe, Blaine Sloane
Lecture: Current Issues in European Integration, 7 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1995).
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In cases of qualified majority voting in the Council, the 87 total votes are
allocated as follows:
- France, Germany, Italy and the UK receive 10 votes each;
- Spain receives 8 votes;
- Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece receive 5 votes
each;
- Austria and Sweden receive 4 votes each;
- Denmark, Ireland and Finland receive 3 votes each; and
- Luxembourg receives 2 votes.'35
Of the 87 total votes, 62 are now required to constitute a qualified majori-
ty;"M this means that 26 votes are necessary to prevent a qualified majori-
ty. If the four neutral countries form an alliance, and this appears highly
possible,'37 they alone can provide 14 opposing votes, requiring just 12
votes of the remaining 73 to prevent action from being taken. Given the
reluctance of other Member States to relinquish control over the handling of
security issues to the WEU, '3 the prospects of consistently winning
approval for security-related joint actions are minimal. In fact, successful,
progressive resolutions on security issues appear unlikely absent some radical
amendment to Title V, such as the installment of a simple majority voting
system on common security issues. Such a change has thus far not been
"' For the allocation of votes to all Member States other than Austria, Finland and
Sweden, see Article 148(2) of the Treaty of Rome. For the allocation of votes to the most
recent three States, see 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 18 (1993).
136 Council Decision of 1 January 1995, art. 8, O.J. L 1/1, at 3 (1985) (amending the
Council agreement reached at loanina, Greece on March 26-27, 1994, when Norway was
expected to accede and thus be represented on the Council).
137 The leader of Ireland's Democratic Left, Mr. Poinsias De Rosa, is among those who
have predicted that Ireland will join with Austria, Finland and Sweden to form a neutral bloc
"which will challenge the pro-WEU consensus and fight for a different approach." Spring
asked to clarify speech on neutrality, IRIsH TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, at 6.
138 The United Kingdom has to date been hesitant to involve itself in matters of common
foreign and security and has been particularly loathe to include the WEU in the handling of
Community security issues. See Giles Tremlett, Europeans disagree on defense, UPI, Nov.
14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; see also European Defence: British
Sceptical of Defence Policy Outside of NATO, supra note 8. The Netherlands has also
periodically restated its preference for NATO and for including the U.S. in the handling of
major security issues. Sean Flynn, New issues in debate on security, IuSH TIMES, Jan. 14,
1994, at 10.
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seriously discussed, and would surely lead to results inconsistent with the
concept of Member State collaboration.
Add to the mix the fact that Austria will hold the Presidency of the
Council for the second six months of 1998, Finland will hold it for the
second half of 1999 and Sweden will hold it for the first half of 2002.139
In addition, the Commission now has representatives from each of the new
Member States," and the new members together have fifty-seven Mem-
bers of the European Parliament.' 4' Austria, Finland and Sweden each has
a judge on the Court of Justice as well, but as the Court of Justice has no
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to Title V, representation on the ICJ is
not relevant to our current discussion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The true impact that the 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden
will have on the European Union's search for a common foreign and security
policy remains to be seen. It is not yet entirely clear whether these newest
Member States will pave the way for a multidimensional Union featuring a
cooperative intergovernmental security policy, or whether the 1995 expansion
will instead be assigned mere footnote status in a Union that ultimately never
fills the huge shoes designed for it. It appears at this point, however, that
the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden will make the formation of a
meaningful common European security policy a very difficult task, if not an
impossible one.
On January 1, 1995, the European Union added three countries which
collectively represent considerable financial, military, and geographic value
to assist in the formation of a common security plan. Under the principle of
the acquis communautaire-which requires, inter alia, that all applicants for
admission to the European Union, as a prerequisite to their accession, accept
unconditionally the whole body of law and all provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty-Austria, Finland and Sweden are required to cooperate fully in every
3 Council Decision of 1 January 1995, Art. 1(1), O.J. L 1/220 (1995). Among the
privileges of this position is agenda setting.
40 The three newest members are Mr. Fischler from Austria, Mr. Likaneu from Finland
and Mrs. Gradin from Sweden. Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States of the European Communities of 1 January 1995, O.J. L 1/222 (1995).
14' Sweden has 21 MEPs, Austria has 20, and Finland has 16. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at
17 (1993).
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aspect of Title V security planning, and to "support the Union's external and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity."'42 This would imply that upon their accession to the European
Union, Austria, Finland and Sweden in essence checked their neutrality at
the door.
As this paper explained, however, such a conclusion ignores political
realities. The principle of the acquis communautaire in no way binds any
state to vote on any particular issue in any particular way. The four neutral
Member States-Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland-are likely to form
a voting bloc which would have fourteen of the eighty-seven total votes on
the Council. These fourteen votes are more than enough to defeat security-
oriented resolutions requiring unanimous approval. When qualified majority
voting is employed, the aforementioned neutral voting bloc still would need
only an additional twelve of the remaining seventy-three votes to defeat such
proposals, hardly an impossible task considering the reluctance of many
Member States to relinquish the handling of important security issues to a
Union inexperienced in these areas.
The truth is that the European Union of yesterday, rife with dissension on
how to handle important common security threats, may also be the European
Union of tomorrow and for some time to come. The recipe for a "common
foreign and security policy," set forth in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty,
failed to list the essential ingredients to achieve such a policy. While the
addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the mix may at first appear to
congeal the odd concoction, its more likely effect is to render political
discord insuperable. In the final analysis, the 1995 accession threatens to
make meaningful intergovernmental cooperation on security issues a soon
forgotten pipe dream.
142 APPENDIX, Art. J.l(4), infra p. 633.
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APPENDIX
TITLE V OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (MAASTRICHT TREATY)
Article J
A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be
governed by the following provisions.
Article J.1
1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a
common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of
this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and
independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in
all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as
well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives
of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives:
- by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States
in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2;
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- by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint
action in the areas in which Member States have important
interests in common.
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive
force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these
principles are complied with.
Article J.2
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the
Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general
interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as
effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common
position.
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the
common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organiza-
tions and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common
positions in such forums.
In international organizations and at international conferences where
not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall
uphold the common positions.
Article J.3
The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the foreign and
security policy shall be the following:
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1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the
European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action.
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall
lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific
objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the
means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage
during its development, define those matters on which decisions are
to be taken by a qualified majority.
Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant
to its preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be
weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council
shall require at least 54 votes in favour, cast by at least eight mem-
bers. 3
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a
question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles
and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As
long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they
adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take
national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided
in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the
Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply
to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council
decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and
failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary
143 After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 62 votes in favor (of a possible
87) are now required. See supra note 136.
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measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general
objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall
inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action,
a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss
them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run
counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness,
Article J.4
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of
a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common
defence.
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence
implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of
the WEU, adopt the necessary practical agreements.
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall
not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain
Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible
with the common security and defence policy established within that
framework.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of
closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral
level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance,
provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that
provided for in this Title.
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6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in
view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels
Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for
in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the
Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of
the progress made and the experience gained until then.
Article J.5
1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the
common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of
common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the
position of the Union in international organizations and international
conferences.
3. In the tasks referred to it in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Presidency shall
be assisted if need be by the previous and next Member States to hold
the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these
tasks.
4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States
represented in international organizations or international conferences
where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter
informed of any matter of common interest.
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security
Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed.
Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council
will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the
positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their
responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
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Article J.6
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the
Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and
their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in
ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the
Council are complied with and implemented.
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint
assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred
to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Article J.7
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects
and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall
ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into
consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by
the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's
foreign and security policy.
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make
recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in
implementing the common foreign and security policy.
Article J.8
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of
the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions
and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
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3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any
question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may
submit proposals to the Council.
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion,
or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene
an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency,
within a shorter period.
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political
Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered
by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition
of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the
Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementa-
tion of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the
Presidency and the Commission.
Article J.9
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the
common foreign and security policy field.
Article J.10
On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4,
the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether
any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common
foreign and security policy.
Article J. 11
1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147,
150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the
areas referred to in this Title.
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2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas
referred to in the Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the
budget of the European Communities.
The Council may also:
- either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which
the implementation of those provisions give rise is to be charged
to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the
budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the
European Community shall be applicable;
- or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the
Member States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to
be decided.

